As we mark one year into the Obama era, several realities have
become painfully clear.
● There are limits to what a U.S. President is willing or able to
do. Obama began
his term in a rush to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace, which he claimed was
in “America’s
national security interests.” One year later and he appears to be no
longer in a rush. In recent interviews he has analyzed the reasons for the
failure to make progress and he pointedly ignored any mentioning of the issue
in his State of the Union. What, of course, is
distressing is that in addressing the other unrealized priorities he set for
his first year (health care, reform of the banking industry, and energy/climate
change), the President has made clear his determination to fight “the
lobbyists and special interests” standing in the way of change. There are
no indications he’ll extend this same fighting spirit to Middle
East peace. His team, headed by George Mitchell, will continue to
work in the field, but for now, with a sluggish economy, still staggeringly
high unemployment, and Congressional elections in November, unless an unlikely
“breakthrough” is in the offing, Obama will direct his personal
energies on issues upper-most on the minds of voters.
● Both the Israeli and Palestinian political situations have become
seriously dysfunctional. Obama
has alluded to this in recent interviews and at a Town Hall session in Florida, last week. This
problem is even more significant than the President suggested. Israeli
hardliners and religiously fanatic settlers pose a serious threat not only to
Palestinians, but to any Israeli government that tries to uproot West Bank settlements. They are a “civil war in the
making” and the danger they pose must be recognized and confronted. While Israel has, at
times made a show of taking them on, albeit in a limited way, I fear no
coalition Israeli government is ready to wage the fight needed to defeat these
elements. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu feels that he has
successfully “gamed” the U.S. Administration and has been emboldened
by his “victories.”
On the Palestinian side, the situation can
only be described as distressed. The Palestinian Authority’s leadership,
already weakened by their 2006 electoral loss, and their deep internal division,
has been further hurt by the “limbs” the U.S. walked them out on (a
settlement freeze and the initial rejection of the Goldstone Report), only to
abandon them in the end. And despite the disasters which Hamas’ failed
leadership has helped to bring down on their people, they don’t appear ready to
change direction any time soon.
● Finally there is the demonstrated weakness of the Arab States to
use their collective strength to launch any “game changing”
diplomatic initiatives. Arabs
should not have waited, as they did, for Obama to take office. The period
between the 2008 election and the Inauguration provided an excellent
opportunity to put forward an Arab initiative to which the new President would
have been forced to respond. Instead, it was Israel that attempted to greet the
incoming Administration with what they hoped would be their disastrous
“game changing” war to eliminate Hamas. And when, at the beginning of
his term, Obama challenged the Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab states to
make “confidence building” gestures to create an improved environment
for peace-making, once again the Arabs had the opportunity to advance their own
proposals. And once again, they did not.
* * *
And so here we are one
year gone, the wind is out of the President’s sails, the situation on the
ground is more troubled and complicated, and the Israelis, though facing some
international pressure, are feeling that they have regained the upper hand in
the U.S.
What can be done? The answer to this question is, most certainly, not to wait
for “magic” from Obama or Mitchell. There are concrete steps Arabs
can take during this period. First and foremost on the agenda should be to
follow the Saudi lead to achieve a broader Arab consensus that will both
restore some degree of Palestinian unity, pressing and helping them to rebuild
their house and support an institution-building effort, like that laid down by
Salam Fayyed. It will also be important for the Palestinians to lay out an
agenda for confronting the occupation and activating and mobilizing their base
in non-violent direct action. The demonstrations in Sheikh Jarrah and at the
Wall demand attention. They can provide the basis for expanded joint
Palestinian-Israeli action.
Such a program can help reenergize the Palestinian base, bring the leadership
and their constituency into a closer working relationship, and draw
international support creating new leverage for Palestinians in future
negotiations. If this is augmented by a renewed Arab peace initiative with a
strong public relations component, it may provide a constructive “game
changer” that could pressure both Israel and US to respond.
This piece was cross-posted from the Huffington Post with the author’s permission,

